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Abstract	For	more	than	15	years,	motor	interference	paradigms	(Brass,	Bekkering,	Wohlschläger,	&	Prinz,	2000;	Brass,	Zysset,	&	von	Cramon,	2001)	have	been	used	to	 investigate	 the	 influence	 of	 action	 observation	 on	 action	 execution.	 Most	research	 on	 so-called	 automatic	 imitation	 has	 focused	 on	 variables	 that	 play	 a	modulating	 role	 or	 investigated	 potential	 confounding	 factors	 (Heyes,	 2011).	Interestingly,	furthermore,	a	number	of	fMRI	studies	have	tried	to	shed	light	on	the	functional	mechanisms	and	neural	correlates	involved	in	imitation	inhibition	(Brass,	Derrfuss,	&	Von	Cramon,	2005;	Spengler,	Bird,	&	Brass,	2010;	Spengler,	Von	 Cramon,	&	Brass,	 2009).	However,	 these	 fMRI	 studies,	 presumably	 due	 to	the	 poor	 temporal	 resolution,	 have	 primarily	 focused	 on	 high-level	 processes	and	 have	 neglected	 the	 potential	 role	 of	 low-level	 motor	 and	 perceptual	processes.	In	the	current	EEG	study,	we	therefore	aimed	to	disentangle	influence	of	 low-level	perceptual	 and	motoric	 from	high-level	 cognitive	mechanisms.	We	focused	 on	 potential	 congruency	 differences	 in	 the	 visual	 N190,	 a	 component	related	 to	 the	 processing	 of	 biological	 motion,	 the	 Readiness	 Potential,	 a	component	 related	 to	 motor	 preparation	 and	 the	 high-level	 P3	 component.	Interestingly,	 we	 detected	 congruency	 effects	 in	 each	 of	 these	 components,	suggesting	that	the	interference	effect	in	an	automatic	imitation	paradigm	is	not	only	 related	 to	 high-level	 processes	 such	 as	 self-other	 distinction	 but	 also	 to	more	 low-level	 influences	 of	 perception	 on	 action	 and	 action	 on	 perception.	Moreover,	we	 documented	 relationships	 of	 the	 neuronal	 effects	with	 (autistic)	behaviour.		
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Introduction	
	 A	plethora	of	studies	have	used	the	imitation	inhibition	paradigm	(Brass,	Bekkering,	 &	 Prinz,	 2001;	 Brass	 et	 al.,	 2000;	 Brass,	 Derrfuss,	 Matthes-von	Cramon,	&	von	Cramon,	2003;	Brass,	Zysset,	et	al.,	2001;	Stürmer,	Aschersleben,	&	Prinz,	2000)	to	 investigate	the	automatic	 influence	of	observed	behaviour	on	own	actions	(for	an	extensive	review,	see	Heyes,	2011).	That	is,	as	compared	to	a	baseline	trial,	individuals	react	slower	and	make	more	errors	when	observing	a	movement	 that	 is	 incompatible	 to	 an	 own	 intended	 movement	 (incongruent	trial),	while	 they	are	 faster	when	 the	observed	movement	 is	 compatible	 to	 the	intended	 movement	 (congruent	 trial).	 This	 behavioural	 congruency	 effect	 is	what	is	referred	to	as	the	‘motor	interference	effect’.	Follow-up	studies	showed	that	 the	 motor	 interference	 effect	 proves	 largely	 distinct	 from	 spatial	compatibility	 effects	 (Bertenthal,	 Longo,	 &	 Kosobud,	 2006;	 Brass	 et	 al.,	 2000;	Heyes,	 Bird,	 Johnson,	 &	 Haggard,	 2005).	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 spatial	correspondence	between	the	own	and	the	observed	movement	cannot	(entirely)	explain	 the	 motor	 interference	 effect.	 This	 led	 to	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	observation	of	another’s	action	triggers	a	corresponding	motor	representation	in	the	observer,	which	then	interferes	with	one’s	own	action	representation	(Brass	et	al.,	2003,	2005;	Brass,	Zysset,	et	al.,	2001;	Stürmer	et	al.,	2000).		However,	 in	 principle,	 the	 interference	 effect	 in	 the	 imitation	 inhibition	paradigm	can	be	explained	by	at	 least	 three	different	processes,	which	are	not	mutually	exclusive.		First,	 the	 participant’s	 motor	 preparation	 of	 the	 intended	 action	 could	impact	 visual	 perception,	 as	 suggested	 by	 numerous	 theoretical	 accounts	 and	
studies	 (Brass	 &	 Heyes,	 2005;	 Greenwald,	 1970;	 Hommel,	 Müsseler,	Aschersleben,	&	Prinz,	2001;	Kühn,	Keizer,	Rombouts,	&	Hommel,	2011b;	 for	a	review,	 see	 Shin,	 Proctor,	 &	 Capaldi,	 2010).	 Here	 the	 basic	 idea	 is	 that	 motor	preparation	 involves	 an	 anticipation	 of	 the	 action	 effect,	which	 could	 facilitate	the	visual	processing	of	a	compatible	observed	hand	movement	(with	respect	to	a	baseline	and	incongruent	trial).	On	the	neural	level,	observed	movements	that	mirror	one’s	own	motor	intention	should	evoke	less	neural	activity	during	visual	processing	than	observed	movements	that	do	not.	Indeed,	this	mirroring	effect	is	likely	 to	 attenuate	 the	 visual	 processing	 of	 congruent	 trials	 compared	 to	incongruent	trials.	We	will	refer	to	these	potential	processes	as	the	influence	of	action	on	perception.		Second,	 the	 observed	 action	 could	 affect	 the	 participant’s	 own	 motor	preparation	 processes,	 as	 suggested	 by	 many	 behavioural	 studies	 (Brass,	Bekkering,	et	al.,	2001;	Brass	et	al.,	2000;	Stürmer	et	al.,	2000).	In	other	words,	observing	 a	movement	 activates	 a	 corresponding	motor	 representation	 in	 the	observer	that	can	be	either	compatible	with	the	intended	action	or	incompatible.	In	 the	compatible	case	response	selection	 is	 facilitated	and	 in	 the	 incompatible	case	 it	 is	 disturbed.	 We	 will	 refer	 to	 these	 processes	 as	 the	 influence	 of	perception	on	action	(Greenwald,	1970;	Hommel	et	al.,	2001;	Shin	et	al.,	2010).		Third,	assuming	that	the	observed	behaviour	leads	to	an	activation	of	the	corresponding	motor	representation	in	the	observer,	observing	a	movement	that	is	 incongruent	 to	 the	 intended	 movement	 can	 induce	 conflict	 that	 has	 to	 be	resolved.	 In	 other	 words,	 it	 is	 reasoned	 that	 the	 two	 motor	 plans	 within	 the	cognitive	system	are	conflicting:	one	that	is	externally	triggered	and	one	that	is	internally	 generated.	 By	 delineating	 the	 internally	 triggered	 motor	
representation	from	the	externally	triggered	motor	representation	(Brass,	Ruby,	&	Spengler,	2009),	high-level	mechanisms	might	help	 individuals	to	distinguish	between	the	self	and	the	observed	other.	Most	imaging	studies	have	focused	on	this	 third	 alternative,	 namely	 on	 resolving	 conflict	 between	 observed	 and	planned	 movements	 (Brass	 et	 al.,	 2005;	 Spengler	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 Spengler,	 Von	Cramon,	et	al.,	2009).	 In	particular,	 it	has	been	shown	that	the	temporoparietal	junction	(TPJ)	and	medial	prefrontal	cortex	(MPFC)	are	involved	in	the	imitation	inhibition	task,	brain	areas	known	to	engage	in	self	versus	other	representation	(Brass	et	al.,	2005;	Sowden	&	Catmur,	2013;	Spengler	et	al.,	2010;	Spengler,	Von	Cramon,	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 This	 led	 researchers	 to	 relate	 a	 social	 function	 to	 these	high-level	 processes	 dealing	with	 self-other	 related	 conflict	 (Brass	 et	 al.,	 2005,	2009;	Santiesteban	et	al.,	2012;	Sowden	&	Catmur,	2013;	Spengler	et	al.,	2010;	Spengler,	Von	Cramon	et	al.,	2009).		Yet,	 functional	magnetic	 resonance	 imaging	 (fMRI)	might	 in	 fact	 not	 be	sensitive	 enough	 to	 capture	 subtle	 effects	 of	 action	 on	 perception	 or	 of	perception	 on	 action,	 because	 of	 temporal	 smearing	 of	 short-lived	 effects	 on	 a	whole-brain	 level.	 Electroencephalography	 (EEG),	 instead,	 has	 a	 high	 temporal	resolution,	which	makes	it	easier	to	delineate	processes	on	different	processing	stages.	An	influence	of	action	on	perception	should	lead	to	effects	in	visual	event-related	 potential	 (ERP)	 components,	 whereas	 an	 influence	 of	 perception	 on	action,	 should	 impact	 ERP	 components	 related	 to	 motor	 preparation,	 which	appear	 right	 before	 movement	 execution.	 Finally,	 resolving	 conflict	 between	observed	 and	 executed	 action	 should	 lead	 to	 congruency	 effects	 in	 central	processing	 stages	 in	 the	 EEG.	We	 concentrated	 on	 3	 functionally	 distinct	 ERP	components.	 First,	 we	 focused	 on	 the	 stimulus-locked	 N190,	 which	 has	 been	
related	 to	visual	processing	of	body	parts	 (Arzy,	Thut,	Mohr,	Michel,	&	Blanke,	2006;	Myers	&	Sowden,	2008;	Thierry	et	al.,	2006).	 	Second,	we	focused	on	the	response	 locked	 Readiness	 Potential	 (RP),	 which	 is	 known	 to	 magnify	 with	increasing	 complexities	 of	 motor	 preparation	 (Leuthold	 &	 Schröter,	 2011;	Rigoni,	Brass,	Roger,	Vidal,	&	Sartori,	2013).	Third,	we	focused	on	the	central	P3	component.	 In	 social	 cognitive	 paradigms,	 this	 component	 proved	 sensitive	 to	self-versus-other	 related	 processes	 (Deschrijver,	 Wiersema,	 &	 Brass,	 2015;	Graux	et	al.,	2013;	Knyazev,	2013;	Kühn,	Nenchev,	et	al.,	2011;	Perrin	et	al.,	2005;	Sebanz,	Knoblich,	Prinz,	&	Wascher,	2006).	This	makes	 the	 component	 a	 likely	neural	 correlate	 of	 high-level	 processes	 of	 social	 cognition,	 which	 were	 put	forward	in	fMRI	studies	(Brass	et	al.,	2005;	Santiesteban	et	al.,	2012;	Spengler	et	al.,	2010;	Spengler,	von	Cramon,	&	Brass,	2009).		Because	we	specifically	wanted	to	explain	 the	mechanisms	that	produce	the	 motor	 interference	 effect,	 we	 also	 aimed	 to	 trace	 correlations	 between	potential	ERP	findings	and	actual	task	performance	(i.e.,	the	congruency	effect	in	the	 reaction	 times	 (RT)	 and	 errors).	 Moreover,	 the	 strength	 of	 motor	interference	effect	was	often	noted	as	crucial	to	understand	inadequate	control	over	 imitative	 behaviours	 in	 various	 patient	 groups	 (Cook,	 Barbalat,	 &	Blakemore,	 2012;	 Cook	 &	 Bird,	 2012;	 Spengler	 et	 al.,	 2010),	 including	 autism	spectrum	 disorder	 (ASD)	 (Bird,	 Leighton,	 Press,	 &	 Heyes,	 2007;	 Cook	 &	 Bird,	2012;	Cook,	Swapp,	Pan,	Bianchi-Berthouze,	&	Blakemore,	2014;	Gowen,	Stanley,	&	Miall,	2008;	Spengler	et	al.,	2010).	In	the	autism	domain,	it	was	suggested	that	individuals	 with	 ASD	 potentially	 lack	 high-level	 social-cognitive	 self-other	distinction,	 which	 would	 lead	 to	 increased	 congruency	 effects	 within	 reaction	times	 (hyperimitation	 effects;	 Bird	 et	 al.,	 2007;	 Sowden,	 Koehne,	 Catmur,	
Dziobek,	&	Bird,	2015;	Spengler	et	al.,	2010).	 It	 is	as	of	yet	however	not	 tested	which	 neural	 mechanism	 contributes	 to	 these	 aberrant	 motor	 interference	effects	 in	 ASD.	 Therefore,	 we	 exploratively	 assessed	 the	 relationship	 between	ERP	congruency	effects	and	ASD	symptomatology	in	our	non-clinical	population,	by	means	of	the	Autism	Quotient	(AQ)	and	Social	Responsiveness	Scale	for	adults	(SRS-A;	 Baron-Cohen,	 Wheelwright,	 Skinner,	 Martin,	 &	 Clubley,	 2001;	 Bölte,	Poustka,	&	Constantino,	2008).	If	autistic	traits	within	a	neurotypical	population	would	 be	 related	 to	 high-level	 self-other	 distinction	 (Bird	 et	 al.,	 2007;	 Sophie	Sowden,	 Koehne,	 Catmur,	 Dziobek,	 &	 Bird,	 2015;	 Spengler	 et	 al.,	 2010),	 one	would	expect	correlations	between	the	autism	questionnaire	scores	and	the	P3	congruency	difference.	
	
Method	
Participants	A	total	of	42	healthy	volunteers	participated	in	the	study.	All	were	right-handed.	None	had	a	history	of	neurological	or	motoric	problems.	They	reported	normal	 or	 corrected-to-normal	 vision	 and	 normal	 tactile	 functioning	 and	hearing.	 All	 participants	 gave	 written	 informed	 consent	 and	 were	 financially	compensated	 for	 their	 participation.	 The	 local	 ethical	 committee	 approved	 the	study.	The	data	of	5	participants	were	excluded	because	of	 technical	problems	during	data	recording	of	the	EEG-signal.	The	remaining	group	for	EEG-analyses	consisted	of	37	participants	(mean	age	M	=	22.70	years;	SD	=	3.61	years;	range	=	18-38	years;	13	male).	Due	to	additional	technical	errors,	the	behavioural	data	of	4	 participants	 could	 not	 be	 included	 in	 the	 behavioural	 analyses.	 This	 left	 33	subjects	in	total	for	the	behavioural	analyses.	
	Design	and	materials	We	adopted	the	established	imitation	inhibition	paradigm	used	in	earlier	research	 (see	 figure	 1;	 Brass	 et	 al.,	 2000;	 2001;	 Spengler	 et	 al.,	 2009).	Participants	 were	 instructed	 to	 execute	 finger	 movements	 in	 response	 to	symbolic	 cues	while	 observing	 congruent,	 incongruent	 or	 no	 finger	movement	performed	by	a	left	hand	positioned	on	a	table	(frontal	view),	presented	on	the	computer	screen.	In	particular,	participants	had	to	respond	the	digit	‘1’	displayed	between	the	index	or	middle	finger	of	a	the	hand	by	lifting	their	index	finger	and	to	a	‘2’	by	lifting	their	middle	finger.	At	the	same	time	the	hand	on	the	computer	screen	executed	either	an	index	finger	movement,	a	middle	finger	movement	or	no	movement	 at	 all.	 In	 a	 congruent	 trial,	 the	 participant	 is	 required	 to	 lift	 the	finger	identical	to	the	observed	hand’s	active	finger	(e.g.	 lifting	the	index	finger	when	an	index	finger	movement	is	observed).	In	an	incongruent	trial,	in	contrast,	the	 participant	 is	 required	 to	 lift	 the	 finger	 opposite	 to	 the	 observed	 hand’s	active	 finger	 (e.g.,	 lifting	 the	 index	 finger	 when	 a	 middle	 finger	 movement	 is	observed).	In	a	baseline	trial,	the	participant	is	required	to	lift	a	finger	while	the	hand	does	not	perform	any	finger	movement.	The	study	started	with	a	24-trial	practice	phase.	After	this,	the	experiment	started,	 in	 which	 50	 congruent	 trials	 (C),	 50	 incongruent	 trials	 (I)	 and	 50	baseline	 trials	 (B)	 were	 randomly	 presented.	 Each	 trial	 started	 with	 a	 frame	showing	a	hand	in	a	resting	position	(2000ms),	mirroring	the	right	hand	of	the	participant.	 This	 frame	was	 followed	 by	 two	 consecutive	 frames	 (34	ms	 each)	that	 showed	 the	 finger	movement	with	 the	 number	 imperative	 (for	 congruent	and	incongruent	trials)	or	just	the	number	imperative	(for	baseline	trials).	Then,	
a	 picture	 showing	 the	 end	 position	 of	 the	 hand	 and	 the	 number	 was	 shown	(1300ms).	 The	 three	 movement	 frames	 gave	 the	 impression	 of	 a	 lifting	movement	of	the	index	or	middle	finger,	respectively.	In	between	trials,	a	black	screen	was	presented	for	2000	ms.	Intermittant	breaks	occurred	after	50	trials,	resulting	into	2	self-paced	pauses.	The	 experiment	 was	 conducted	 in	 a	 dimly	 lit,	 electrically	 shielded	 and	sound	 attenuated	 room.	 The	 participant	 was	 seated	 at	 approximately	 60	 cm	distance	 from	 a	 17inch	 monitor	 in	 front	 of	 him.	 The	 participant’s	 index	 and	middle	finger	of	the	right	hand	were	placed	on	the	two	leftmost	finger	positions	on	 a	 response-box	 with	 four	 light	 sensors.	 Reaction	 times	 of	 the	 onset	 of	 the	finger	lifting	movements	were	recorded	with	this	device.	A	keyboard	was	placed	within	 reach	 of	 the	 left	 hand.	 Stimulus	 delivery	 and	 data	 acquisition	 were	achieved	 by	 means	 of	 the	 programme	 Presentation	 (Neurobs),	 ran	 on	 a	 HP	Compaq	 desktop	 with	 Windows	 XP	 driver.	 The	 data	 collection	 for	 this	experiment	was	part	of	3	different	larger	studies.	In	each	of	the	studies,	the	order	of	 the	 current	 experiment	 was	 counterbalanced	 with	 a	 second,	 unrelated	experiment.			
EEG	recording	and	analyses	The	 EEG-data	 were	 recorded	 with	 a	 Biosemi	 ActiveTwo	 system	 (at	 a	sampling	 rate	 of	 1024	 Hz).	 We	 placed	 64	 active	 Biosemi	 EEG-electrodes	according	to	the	international	10/20	setting.	Two	electrodes	were	placed	on	the	mastoids	 for	 offline	 rereferencing.	 To	 measure	 eye	 movements,	 bipolar	electrodes	 were	 placed	 with	 left	 and	 right	 canthal	 montage	 and	 additionally	above	and	below	the	left	eye.	Electrode	offsets	were	kept	between	-25	and	25	µV	
at	 all	 electrodes.	 We	 used	 BrainVision	 Analyzer	 2	 (BVA	 2;	 Brain	 Products)	 to	analyze	 the	data.	After	offline	 re-referencing	 the	data	 to	 the	average	of	 the	 left	and	right	mastoid,	we	applied	a	high	pass	filter	of	0.1	Hz,	a	low	pass	filter	of	30	Hz,	and	a	notch	 filter	of	50	Hz.	Prior	 to	averaging,	 the	data	were	automatically	corrected	for	eye	movement	artifacts	by	means	of	the	bipolar	electrodes	around	the	 eyes.	 An	 automatic	 artifact	 rejection	 included	 a	 gradient	 check	 (maximum	allowed	 voltage	 step:	 50	 µV/ms	 within	 200	 ms	 before	 and	 after	 the	 locked	event),	 a	 minimum/maximum	 amplitude	 check	 (-100	 µV	 and	 100	 µV	respectively),	 and	 a	 low	 activity	 check	 (0.5	 µV	 within	 an	 interval	 length	 of	100ms).	 Only	 trials	 for	 which	 the	 participants	 produced	 the	 correct	 response	between	200	and	1200	ms	after	 stimulus	onset	were	 included	 in	 the	 analyses.	We	collapsed	the	data	over	left	and	right	finger	movement	observations	because	we	were	primarily	 interested	 in	congruency-related	processes.	We	 time-locked	the	 stimulus-related	 ERP	 components	 (N190	 and	 P3)	 to	 the	 onset	 of	 the	 first	frame	with	an	instruction	number	(directly	following	the	resting	position	frame)	and	 the	response-related	RP	 to	 the	onset	of	 the	participant’s	 finger	movement.	All	trials	received	a	baseline	correction	of	100	ms	before	the	respective	onset.	All	 statistical	 analyses	 were	 performed	with	 SPSS	 Statistics	 22.	 For	 the	N190	and	P3,	we	identified	time	windows	and	relevant	electrode	sites	at	stable	peak	 topographies	 (see	 figure	 2A)	 and	 performed	 analyses	 on	 exported	mean	area	amplitudes.	For	the	N190,	we	focused	on	the	time	window	from	170	to	220	ms,	 and	pooled	 the	activity	per	 condition	at	 left	hemispheric	 electrodes	P5,	P7	and	 PO7,	 and	 at	 the	 right	 hemispheric	 electrodes	 P6,	 P8	 and	 PO8.	 For	 the	stimulus-locked	 P3,	 we	 pooled	 the	 activity	 at	 electrodes	 CPz,	 Pz	 and	 POz	 per	condition	 in	 the	 time	window	 from	 310	 to	 430	ms.	 Based	 on	 earlier	 research	
(Leuthold	&	Schröter,	 2011;	Rigoni	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Shibasaki	&	Hallett,	 2006),	we	identified	 the	 RP	 component	 in	 the	 response-locked	 segments	 as	 the	 gradient	shift	preceding	the	steep	negative	slope	before	response	onset	at	electrode	FCz	(i.e.,	from	-400	to	-100	ms	for	the	current	dataset).	To	disentangle	the	activity	of	the	 supplementary	motor	 area	 from	motor	 execution	 processes	 in	 the	M1,	we	increased	 the	 spatial	 resolution	 of	 the	 EEG-signal	 by	 means	 of	 Laplacian	transformations	(Rigoni	et	al.,	2013;	Tandonnet,	Burle,	Hasbroucq,	&	Vidal,	2005;	Vidal,	Grapperon,	Bonnet,	&	Hasbroucq,	2003).	We	estimated	surface	Laplacians	from	the	averaged	monopolar	EEG	signal.	First,	we	interpolated	the	signal	with	the	 spherical	 spline	 interpolation	 procedure,	 and	 then	 computed	 second	derivatives	 in	the	two	dimensions	of	the	space	(degree	of	spline	=	3,	maximum	degrees	the	Legendre	Polynomial	=	15.	Conform	earlier	studies	(e.g.,	Rigoni	et	al.,	2013;	Vidal	et	al.,	2003)	and	the	observed	topography	(figure	2A),	we	conducted	LP-analyses	on	electrode	FCz.			We	analyzed	results	of	both	behavioural	and	(pooled)	EEG-data	of	the	RP	and	P3	component	by	means	of	one-way	within-subjects	ANOVAs	with	Condition	as	a	factor	(including	the	levels:	B,	C,	I).	For	the	N190	EEG-data,	we	additionally	included	 a	 factor	 Hemisphere.	 Greenhouse-Geisser	 corrections	 were	 applied	where	 needed.	 We	 used	 repeated-measures	 t-tests	 for	 paired	 comparisons.	Because	of	the	non-parametric	distribution	of	our	effects,	Spearman’s	correlation	coefficients	 were	 used	 for	 correlational	 tests.	 Any	 differences	 between	congruent/incongruent	 trials	 and	 the	 baseline	 trial	 are	 to	 some	 degree	 trivial	because	 both	 the	 congruent	 and	 the	 incongruent	 condition	 involve	movement	while	the	baseline	condition	does	not.	Therefore,	we	decided	to	mainly	focus	on	the	analyses	involving	the	congruent	and	incongruent	conditions.	
	
Results	
Behavioural	results	As	 typically	 described	 in	 the	 imitation	 inhibition	 paradigm,	we	 found	 a	significant	RT	difference	for	congruency	(F(1.33,	42.45)	=	60.831,	p	<	0.001,	η2	=	0.66).	 Participants	 reacted	 slower	 in	 incongruent	 trials	 (M	 =	 503.36	ms;	 SD	 =	76.69	 ms)	 than	 in	 congruent	 trials	 (M	 =	 432.46	 ms;	 SD	 =	 45.55;	 paired	comparisons	t(32)	=	9.04,	p	<	0.001),	while	the	RTs	of	the	baseline	condition	fell	in	between	(M	=	471.62	ms;	SD	=	47.84;	respective	paired	comparisons:	t(32)	=	11.02,	p	<	0.001	and	t(32)	=	4.47,	p	<	0.001).	Analyses	on	the	error	percentages	(including	 erroneous	 as	 well	 as	 missed	 responses)	 showed	 a	 significant	difference	 for	congruency	as	well	(F(1.26;	40.32)	=	17.14,	p	<	0.001,	η2	=	0.35).	Paired	 comparisons	 showed	 that	 significantly	 more	 errors	 were	 made	 in	 the	incongruent	condition	(M	=	5.47%;	SD	=	0.06%)	than	in	the	congruent	condition	(M	 =	 0.68%;	 SD	 =	 0.01%;	 t(32)	 =	 4.57,	 p	 <	 0.001)	 and	 than	 in	 the	 baseline	condition	 (M	 =	 1.38%;	 SD	 =	 0.02%;	 t(32)	 =	 3.99,	 p	 <	 0.001).	 No	 difference	between	 the	 error	 rates	 of	 the	 congruent	 and	 baseline	 condition	 was	 found	(t(32)	=	1.44;	p	=	0.16).	
	
EEG	results	
N190.	 The	ANOVA	with	Condition	and	Hemisphere	 as	 factors	 showed	a	strong	main	 effect	 of	 Condition	 (F(1.51,	 54.24)	 =	 18.28;	 p	 <	 0.001;	 partial	 η2	=	0.34),	 and	 of	 Hemisphere	 (F(1,	 36)	 =	 6.33;	 p	 <	 0.05;	 partial	 η2	=	 0.15),	 yet	 no	interaction	of	Condition	and	Hemisphere	(F(1.62,	58.39)	=	1.15;	p	=	0.32;	partial	η2	=	0.03;	Figure	3A,B).	The	main	effect	of	Hemisphere	signified	that	larger	N190	
amplitudes	were	measured	at	left-lateralized	hemisphere	sites.	Paired	t-tests	on	the	 conditions	 collapsed	 over	 hemispheres	 showed	 that	 the	 congruent	 and	incongruent	 conditions	 elicited	 larger	 amplitudes	 than	 the	 baseline	 condition	(respectively	 t(36)=	3.99;	p	<	0.001;	and	 t(36)	=	4.99,	p	<	0.001).	 Importantly,	the	 t-test	 on	 congruent	 and	 incongruent	 trials	 also	 yielded	 a	 significant	 result	(t(36)	 =	 2.11;	 p	 <	 0.05),	 indicating	 that	 incongruent	 trials	 elicited	 larger	N190	components		than	congruent	trials.			
RP.	 The	 one-way	 ANOVA	 on	 the	 RP	 Laplacians	 showed	 a	 significant	difference	between	the	three	conditions	(F(2,	72)	=	5.91,	p	<	0.005,	η2	=	0.14;	see	figure	 4A,B).	 The	 incongruent	 condition	 (M	 =	 -16.13μV/m2,	 SD	 =	 24.41μV/m2)	elicited	larger	RP	Laplacians	than	the	congruent	condition	(M	=	-7.01μV/m2,	SD	=	18.42μV/m2;	 t(36)	 =	 2.99,	 p	 =	 0.005).	 Interestingly	 however,	 the	 incongruent	condition	 did	 not	 differ	 from	 the	 baseline	 condition	 (M	 =	 -16,46μV/m2,	 SD	 =	3.07μV/m2;	t(36)	=	-.100,	p	=	.92),	whereas	the	congruent	effect	did	(t(36)	=	3.11,	p	 <	 0.004).	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 observed	 hand	 movements	 yielded	 response	facilitation	processes	in	the	congruent	condition,	but	no	response	interference	in	the	 incongruent	 condition.	 The	 congruency	 effects	 (I-C	 for	 N190	 and	 RP	Laplacian	have	evidently	distinct	topographies.	The	topography	maps	show	that	the	 congruency	 effect	 for	 the	 N190	 (170-220	 ms	 after	 stimulus	 onset)	 is	strongest	at	left	parietal	sites,	while	it	is	most	pronounced	for	the	RP	Laplacian	(330-100	 ms	 before	 resonse	 onset)	 at	 frontocentral	 midline	 electrodes	 (see	figure	2B).		
P3.	In	the	P3	component,	the	ANOVA	showed	that	significant	differences	existed	 between	 the	 three	 conditions	 (F(2,72)	 =	 19.27,	 p	 <	 0.001,	 partial	 η2	=	0.35;	see	 figure	5A,B).	The	congruent	trials	(pooled	average:	M	=	9.61	μV,	SD	=	
4.80	μV)	and	the	incongruent	trials	(pooled	average:	M	=	8.57	μV,	SD	=	4.64	μV)	elicited	larger	P3	amplitudes	than	baseline	trials	(pooled	average:	M	=	7.48	μV,	SD	=	4,47	μV;	 t(36)	=	5.36,	p	=	0.001	and	t(36)	=	3.20,	p	<	0.005	respectively).	Incongruent	trials	elicited	smaller	P3	amplitudes	than	congruent	trials	(t(36)	=	3.69,	 p	 =	 0.001).	 In	 other	 words,	 observed	 hand	 movements	 that	 were	compatible	 to	 own	 motor	 intentions	 yielded	 larger	 P3	 components	 than	observed	hand	movements	that	were	incompatible	to	own	motor	intentions.		
Correlational	results		
ERP	congruency	effects	and	the	RT	congruency	effect.	We	 computed	the	RT	congruency	effect	 for	RT	(I-C),	 for	 the	RP	(C-I),	 for	 the	P3	(C-I)	and	 the	congruency	 difference	 for	 the	 N190	 pooled	 over	 hemispheres	 (C-I).	 To	 avoid	detecting	 correlational	 effects	 driven	 by	 outliers,	 we	 discarded	 congruency	effects	from	the	analyses	that	were	above	or	below	2.5	standard	deviations	from	their	respective	mean,	resulting	in	the	exclusion	of	1	participant	on	the	basis	of	his	RT	congruency	effect	and	1	participant	on	the	basis	of	his	score	on	the	total	dimensional	scale	of	the	AQ.	We	then	correlated	the	ERP	congruency	effects	with	the	RT	 congruency	 effect.	 Interestingly,	 the	 P3	 effect	was	 positively	 correlated	with	 the	 behavioural	 interference	 effect	 (ρ	 =	 .45,	 p	 <	 0.01;	 see	 figure	 6).	Individuals	with	a	 large	congruency	effect	 in	the	P3	component	showed	a	 large	behavioural	 congruency	 effect.	 No	 other	 correlations	 reached	 or	 trended	 to	significance	(both	p	>	0.16).	
ERP	congruency	effects	and	non-clinical	autistic	behaviours.	We	then	correlated	the	ERP	effects	with	the	total	dimensional	scores	on	the	AQ	and	on	the	
SRS-A	questionnaire.	Here,	we	did	not	detect	any	significant	correlations	(all	p	>	0.47).	 	
Discussion	Despite	almost	15	years	of	research	on	the	influence	of	action	observation	on	action	execution	using	 interference	 tasks,	 the	 exact	mechanisms	underlying	the	 motor	 interference	 effect	 are	 still	 poorly	 understood.	 From	 a	 theoretical	perspective,	 three	 sources	 might	 contribute	 to	 the	 interference	 effect:	 the	influence	 of	 action	 on	 perception,	 the	 influence	 of	 perception	 on	 action	 and	conflict	resolution	of	the	competing	representations.	While	behavioural	research	has	 primarily	 focused	on	 variables	 that	modulate	 the	 interference	 effect	 (for	 a	review,	see	Heyes,	2011)	or	on	potential	confounds	such	as	spatial	compatibility	(e.g.	 Brass	 et	 al.,	 2000),	 not	much	 research	 has	 directly	 addressed	 the	 specific	sources	 of	 the	 effect.	 By	 contrast,	 fMRI	 research	 has	 primarily	 focused	 on	 one	potential	source	of	the	interference	effect,	namely	on	conflict	resolution	between	the	planned	and	observed	action	(Brass	et	al.,	2005,	2009;	Spengler	et	al.,	2010).		In	the	current	study	we	used	EEG	to	delineate	three	potential	sources	of	motor	interference.	We	argue	that	EEG	is	more	sensitive	to	subtle	differences	on	the	perceptual	and	motor	level,	because	it	allows	differentiating	these	processes	in	the	temporal	domain.		The	imitation	inhibition	paradigm	has	been	investigated	only	once	using	EEG.	 This	 study,	 however,	 focused	 on	 emotion	 perception,	 rather	 than	 on	 the	mechanisms	of	automatic	imitation	(Grecucci,	Balaban,	Buiatti,	Budai,	&	Rumiati,	2009).	 The	 current	 study	 assessed	 the	 original	 imitation	 inhibition	 paradigm	(Brass	et	al.,	2000;	Brass	&	Heyes,	2005)	by	means	of	EEG.	We	focused	on	three	
EEG	components	that	should	in	our	opinion	index	the	three	potential	sources	of	the	 interference	effect,	namely	the	visual	N190	 indexing	the	 influence	of	action	on	 perception,	 the	 motor-related	 RP	 indexing	 the	 influence	 of	 perception	 on	action	 and	 the	 P3	 component	 indexing	 conflict	 resolution.	 Interestingly,	 we	detected	congruency	effects	 in	all	of	 these	ERP	components,	 suggesting	 that	all	aforementioned	 processes	 play	 a	 role	 in	 the	 imitation	 inhibition	 task.	 To	 our	knowledge	this	is	the	first	evidence	showing	that	different	sources	contribute	to	interference	effects	in	the	imitation	inhibition	task.			
The	effect	of	action	on	perception	
First,	 we	 aimed	 to	 detect	 the	 effect	 of	 action	 on	 perception	 within	 the	amplitudes	 of	 the	 N190,	which	 had	 been	 related	 to	 activity	 in	 the	 extrastriate	body	area	 (EBA)	of	 the	visual	 system	(Thierry	et	al.,	 2006).	Over	hemispheres,	N190	amplitudes	were	larger	for	congruent	and	incongruent	trials,	 in	which	an	imperative	stimulus	and	a	finger	movement	was	displayed,	compared	to	baseline	trials,	 where	 an	 imperative	 stimulus	 but	 no	 finger	 movement	 was	 displayed.	Evaluating	the	difference	between	the	congruent	and	incongruent	condition	and	the	 baseline	 condition	 is	 not	 very	 informative	 here	 because	 it	 compares	 two	conditions	that	show	movement	with	a	condition	that	does	not	show	movement.		
Importantly,	 the	 N190	 components	 showed	 larger	 amplitudes	 for	incongruent	 than	 for	 congruent	 trials.	 In	 other	words,	 hand	 actions	 that	were	compatible	to	one’s	own	action	intention	evoked	less	brain	activation	related	to	the	visual	processing	of	body-parts	than	hand	actions	incompatible	to	the	action	intention.	 This	 suggests	 that	 compatible	 observed	 hand	 actions	 required	 less	
visual	 processing	 ‘effort’	 than	 the	 incompatible	 ones,	 leading	 to	 larger	 N190	amplitudes	 for	 the	 latter.	 	 In	 other	words,	 a	 compatible	 action	 intention	might	have	facilitated	the	visual	processing	of	observed	congruent	 finger	movements.	As	 an	 alternative	 interpretation,	 one	 could	 assume	 that	 the	 N190	 effect	 could	reflect	 processes	 of	 visual	 (Vocks	 et	 al.,	 2010)	 or	 embodied	 self-other	discrimination,	which	is	considered	as	functionally	distinct	from	high-level,	more	cognitive	 self-other	 distinction	 (Arzy	 et	 al.,	 2006).	 Indeed,	 it	 was	 described	already	that	the	EBA,	which	typically	underlies	the	N190	amplitudes	(Thierry	et	al.,	2006),	responds	more	strongly	to	movements	that	are	clearly	someone	else’s	(David	et	al.,	2009;	Myers	&	Sowden,	2008;	Stanley	&	Miall,	2007;	but	see	Vocks	et	 al.,	 2010).	 Because	 drawing	 conclusions	 from	 the	 baseline	 condition	 of	 the	imitation	inhibition	task	is	difficult	(see	earlier),	we	can	for	now	not	disentangle	these	 two	 potential	 interpretations.	 Noteworthily	 though,	 an	 interpretation	 in	terms	 of	 visual	 self-other	 distinction	 doesn’t	 necessarily	 go	 against	 an	interpretation	 in	 terms	 of	 action	 effects	 on	 perception.	 Indeed,	 when	 the	expected	 visual	 consequences	 of	 one’s	 action	 intentions	 facilitate	 the	 actual	visual	observation	of	a	hand	moving	(congruent	trials),	the	observed	hand	action	is	more	likely	to	be	part	of	one’s	own	body.	Similarly,	when	the	expected	visual	consequences	 of	 one’s	 action	 intention	 do	 not	 match	 the	 observed	 hand	movement,	 the	 visual	 processing	 thereof	 becomes	 more	 effortful	 and	 the	observed	hand	is	not	likely	to	be	one’s	own.		
The	 finding	 is	 consistent	 with	 recent	 studies	 which	 showed	 that	 the	compatibility	 of	 cued	 action	 intentions	 modulates	 the	 visual	 processing	 of	subsequently	observed	actions,	as	reflected	in	an	ERP-components	similar	to	the	
N190	(Bortoletto,	Mattingley,	&	Cunnington,	2011;	Press,	Gherri,	Heyes,	&	Eimer,	2010)	and	in	brain	activity	in	V1	as	measured	in	an	fMRI	study	(Stanley	&	Miall,	2007).	 In	 aforementioned	 EEG-studies	 that	 reported	 an	 interaction	 of	 action	observation	and	action	intentions	within	early	visual	components	(Bortoletto	et	al.,	2011;	Press	et	al.,	2010),	participants	were	 told	which	response	 to	prepare	before	 the	 visual	 action	 stimulus	 was	 presented.	 In	 contrast	 to	 these	 studies,	participants	 in	 our	 study	 did	 not	 know	which	 response	 to	 prepare	 before	 the	imperative	stimulus	was	presented.	An	effect	of	action	on	perception	by	190	ms	in	 our	 study	 can	 therefore	 be	 considered	 as	 very	 quick:	 It	 suggests	 that	 the	imperative	 information	 has	 reached	motor	 preparation	 areas	 and	 has	 also	 fed	back	to	perceptual	processes	within	this	short	period	of	time.	It	should	however	be	 noted	 that	 reaction	 times	 reflect	 both	 response	 selection	 and	 response	execution	processes.	It	is	likely	that	the	effect	of	action	on	perception	is	affected	by	early	response	selection	processes	rather	than	response	execution	processes	(see	also	below).	
The	 finding	 also	 suggests	 that	 the	N190	 component	 responded	 to	 trials	showing	motion	of	hands	and	not	just	to	trials	showing	hands	per	se.	Because	the	neutral	hand	posture	had	been	displayed	 from	 the	 start	of	 the	 trial,	 the	neural	activity	within	 the	N190	 component	 for	 congruent	 and	 incongruent	 conditions	can	only	be	due	to	the	observed	movement	of	the	hand.	Given	the	limited	spatial	resolution	of	EEG,	this	result	may	not	be	surprising:	the	MT+	area	in	the	human,	which	 is	 dedicated	 to	 the	 visual	 processing	 of	 biological	 actions,	 is	 known	 to	show	 some	overlap	with	 the	EBA	 (Ferri,	Kolster,	 Jastorff,	&	Orban,	 2013).	 It	 is	therefore	reasonable	to	assume	that	the	N190	component	might	have	picked	up	
activity	coming	from	this	latter	area	as	well.	Similar	findings	were	also	reported	in	 other	 studies,	with	 action	 observations	 (Bortoletto	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 Press	 et	 al.,	2010)	 and	 changes	 in	 body	 configuration	 (Borhani,	 Borgomaneri,	 Làdavas,	 &	Bertini,	 2016;	 Borhani,	 Làdavas,	 Maier,	 Avenanti,	 &	 Bertini,	 2015)	 leading	 to	larger	N190	components.	Additionally,	it	could	be	noted	that	an	increased	visual	saliency	of	the	congruency	conditions	compared	to	the	baseline	condition	(which	did	 not	 contain	 visual	movement)	might	 account	 for	 this	 difference.	 Given	 the	known	 association	 between	 activity	 within	 the	 N190	 and	 biological	 (body-related)	 processes,	 we	 consider	 the	 possibility	 that	 the	 N190	 modulation	reflected	 the	 visual	 processing	 of	 ‘mere’	 (non-biological)	 movement	 unlikely	(though	we	cannot	fully	discard	it	based	on	our	design	alone;	see	also	Press	et	al.,	2010).	
Overall,	 the	 current	 N190-results	 add	 to	 findings	 which	 showed	 that	action	 representations	 of	 own	 movements	 influence	 different	 stages	 of	perception	 (Calvo-Merino,	 Grèzes,	 Glaser,	 Passingham,	 &	 Haggard,	 2006;	Craighero,	Fadiga,	Rizzolatti,	&	Umiltà,	1999;	Hamilton,	Wolpert,	&	Frith,	2004;	Kühn,	 Keizer,	 Rombouts,	 &	 Hommel,	 2011a;	 Schütz-Bosbach	 &	 Prinz,	 2007;	Thomaschke,	2012).	 Interestingly,	 fMRI	studies	on	 the	 imitation-inhibition	 task	so	far	did	not	reveal	activation	in	EBA/MT	(Brass	et	al.,	2005;	Kontaris,	Wiggett,	&	Downing,	2009;	Spengler	et	al.,	2010;	Spengler,	Von	Cramon,	et	al.,	2009).	We	think	that	this	is	due	to	the	fact	that	fMRI	is	less	sensitive	to	such	subtle	changes.		
	
The	effect	of	perception	on	action	
	
Next,	we	focused	on	low-level	mechanisms	of	imitative	control	at	the	level	of	 action	 preparation,	 as	 reflected	 in	 the	 RP.	 Confirming	 our	 hypothesis,	 we	detected	 a	 congruency	 effect	 for	 the	 Laplacian	RP	 (Leuthold	&	 Schröter,	 2011;	Rigoni	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Shibasaki	 &	 Hallett,	 2006).	 The	 congruent	 trials	 elicited	smaller	RP	Laplacians	than	the	incongruent	trials	and	baseline	trials.	We	did	not	detect	 a	 significant	 difference	 between	 the	 incongruent	 and	 the	 baseline	condition.	This	suggests	that	the	observation	of	incompatible	movements	did	not	disturb	response	selection	processes,	as	compared	to	observing	no	movement	at	all.	The	results	may	thus	show	that	the	preparation	of	own	actions	was	facilitated	when	the	observed	hand	movement	matched	the	intended	one.	As	such,	the	data	would	reveal	a	facilitation	mechanism	for	congruent	trials	at	the	level	of	motor	selection.	However,	 also	 here,	 one	 should	 be	 careful	with	 drawing	 conclusions	from	 the	 baseline	 condition.	 Overall,	 with	 the	 current	 results	 we	 confirm	 that	action	 perception	 influences	 the	 preparation	 of	 own	 movements,	 as	 was	predicted	by	various	theoretical	works	(Brass	&	Heyes,	2005;	Greenwald,	1970;	Hommel	et	al.,	2001;	Rizzolatti	&	Craighero,	2004;	Shin	et	al.,	2010).		
High-level	cognitive	processes:	P3	results	
Finally,	we	observed	a	congruency	effect	in	the	P3	component,	which	we	put	 forward	 as	 a	 likely	 neural	 correlate	 for	 self-other	 distinction	 processes.	 In	the	current	study,	we	showed	that	congruent	trials	elicited	larger	P3	amplitudes	than	 incongruent	 trials.	As	we	assume	 that	 self-other	distinction	 is	 required	 to	distinguish	 the	 intended	 from	 the	 externally	 triggered	 motor	 plan,	 the	congruency	difference	may	reflect	the	conflict	between	the	two	motor	plans.	The	
findings	 suggest	 that	 the	 P3	 was	 most	 sensitive	 to	 condition	 in	 which	 the	observed	action	was	consistent	with	the	intended	action	of	the	participant.	The	baseline	 condition,	 which	 did	 not	 present	 any	 hand	 movement,	 elicited	 the	smallest	 P3	 amplitude,	 potentially	 suggesting	 that	 the	 brain	 might	 have	perceived	 it	 as	 least	 compatible	 to	 one’s	 own	 action	 intention	 or	 that	 this	condition	was	less	visually	salient	(conform	to	findings	in	oddball	tasks,	e.g.,	see	Donchin,	1981).		 
The	 current	 results	 follow	 earlier	 EEG-findings	 in	 social	 cognitive	paradigms	 which	 reported	 larger	 P3	 amplitudes	 for	 congruent	 trials	 in	 the	context	of	self-versus-other	processing	(e.g.,	Holeckova	et	al.,	2006;	Longo	et	al.,	2012;	 Zhou	 et	 al.,	 2010)	 such	 as	 hearing	 one’s	 own	name	or	 seeing	 one’s	 own	face	 (Cygan,	 Tacikowski,	 Ostaszewski,	 Chojnicka,	 &	Nowicka,	 2014;	Holeckova,	Fischer,	Giard,	Delpuech,	&	Morlet,	2006;	Perrin	et	al.,	2005;	Tacikowski,	Cygan,	&	 Nowicka,	 2014;	 Tacikowski,	 Jednoróg,	 Marchewka,	 &	 Nowicka,	 2011;	Tacikowski	 &	 Nowicka,	 2010),	 or	 perceiving	 touch/seeing	 actions	 that	 are	compatible	to	own	touch/own	actions	(de	la	Asuncion,	Bervoets,	Morrens,	Sabbe,	&	 De	 Bruijn,	 2015;	 Deschrijver	 et	 al.,	 2015;	 Longo,	 Musil,	 &	 Haggard,	 2012;	Ruissen	 &	 de	 Bruijn,	 2015).	 Studies	 that	 have	 focused	 on	 self-other	 related	conflict	 in	 the	 somatosensory	 domain	 reported	 similar	 modulations	 brain	activity	around	300	ms	at	parietal	sites	(Longo	et	al.,	2012;	Papeo,	Longo,	Feurra,	&	 Haggard,	 2010).	 Noteworthy,	 in	 the	 non-social	 domain,	 it	 is	 a	 common	observation	 that	 the	 parietal	 P3	 is	 smaller	 for	 incongruent	 versus	 congruent	trials	 (e.g.,	 Hillman,	 Belopolsky,	 Snook,	 Kramer,	 &	 McAuley,	 2004;	 Hillman,	Snook,	 &	 Jerome,	 2003;	 Mahé,	 Doignon-Camus,	 Dufour,	 &	 Bonnefond,	 2014;	
Neuhaus	 et	 al.,	 2010)	 even	 though	 surprising	 events	 generally	 elicit	 larger	 P3	components	 (Donchin,	 1981).	 These	 findings	 have	 been	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	increased	need	for	interference	control	 in	the	incongruent	condition,	 leading	to	less	 available	 resources	 that	 are	 also	needed	 for	 generating	 the	P3	 component	(Kok,	 2001;	 Polich,	 2007).	 Similarly,	 one	 could	 hypothesize	 that	 a	 mechanism	resolving	 the	 conflict	 between	 own	 actions	 and	 incompatible	 observed	 actions	would	lead	to	smaller	P3	components	in	the	context	of	self-versus-other	related	high-level	processes.  
			Our	 findings	 are	 in	 addition	 consistent	 with	 previous	 fMRI	 studies	implicating	the	role	of	self-other	distinction	in	the	imitation	inhibition	paradigm	(Brass	et	al.,	2009;	Santiesteban	et	al.,	2012;	Sowden	&	Catmur,	2013;	Spengler	et	al.,	2010;	Spengler,	Von	Cramon,	et	al.,	2009).	Moreover,	though	the	sources	of	the	 P3-component	 are	 difficult	 to	 localize,	 the	 temporo-parietal	 junction	 (TPJ),	the	 medial	 prefrontal	 cortex	 (mPFC)	 and	 the	 precuneus	 have	 been	 named	 as	potential	neural	underpinnings	(Knyazev,	2013;	Mulert	et	al.,	2004;	Papeo	et	al.,	2010;	 Perrin	 et	 al.,	 2005;	 Verleger,	 Jaśkowski,	 &	Wascher,	 2005).	 These	 brain	areas	 were	 deemed	 important	 in	 self-other	 distinction	 processes	 by	aforementioned	 fMRI	 studies	 of	 the	 imitation	 inhibition	paradigm	 (Spengler	 et	al.,	2010;	Spengler,	Von	Cramon,	et	al.,	2009).		
In	 sum,	 the	 P3	 findings	 contribute	 vastly	 to	 earlier	 fMRI	 studies	 of	 the	imitation	 inhibition	 task,	 by	 not	 only	 confirming	 the	 involvement	 of	 high-level	conflict-related	 processes	 in	 the	 task	 but	 also	 by	 clarifying	 the	 timing	 thereof	(Brass	et	al.,	2009;	Santiesteban	et	al.,	2012;	S.	Sowden	&	Catmur,	2013;	Spengler	et	al.,	2010;	Spengler,	Von	Cramon,	et	al.,	2009).	
Relative	timing	of	the	neural	processes	As	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 Figure	 4A,	 the	RP	 has	 an	 early	 onset	 around	 350	ms	before	 the	 participant’s	 response.	While	 the	 RP	 is	 locked	 to	 this	 response	 and	mean	reaction	times	of	congruent	and	incongruent	processes	are	around	430	ms	and	500	ms	respectively,	the	onset	of	the	early	readiness	potential	is	about	80	to	150	ms	after	stimulus	presentation.	The	N190	peaks	about	190	ms	post	stimulus.	As	 such,	 it	 can	 be	 speculated	 that	 early	 response	 selection	 processes	 starting	around	80	to	150	ms	after	stimulus	onset	 feed	back	to	the	visual	processing	of	the	observed	hand	action	(Borhani	et	al.,	2015;	Bortoletto	et	al.,	2011;	Press	et	al.,	 2010).	 In	 other	 words,	 we	 assume	 that	 early	 motor	 planning	 processes	(response	selection)	influence	perception	of	biological	motion,	which	is	reflected	in	the	congruency	effect	of	the	N190.	Congruency	effects	in	the	RP	are	observed	a	little	 bit	 later:	 Visual	 processing	 of	 the	 congruent	 and	 incongruent	 movement	might	 therefore	 influence	 later	 stages	of	motor	preparation,	 as	 reflected	 in	 the	congruency	effect	within	RP.	Finally,	the	P3	effect	is	largest	around	300-400	ms.	We	 think	 the	 conflict	 between	 the	 intended	 and	 externally	 triggered	 motor	representations	drives	the	P3.	In	other	words,	the	P3	may	reflect	the	high-level	social	 cognitive	 processes	 which	 delineate	 the	 external	 motor	 representation	from	the	internally	generated	one	(Brass	et	al.,	2009;	Brass,	Zysset,	et	al.,	2001;	Spengler	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 The	 timing	 of	 the	 P3	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 functional	interpretations	thereof	which	assume	that	 it	 is	 influenced	by	perceptual,	motor	as	well	as	stimulus	decision	processes	(Verleger	et	al.,	2005).		
	
Correlational	results	
As	a	final	goal	of	this	study,	we	wanted	to	investigate	which	of	the	three	mechanisms	 identified	 above	 contributed	 most	 to	 the	 behavioural	 motor	interference	 effect	 and	which	of	 these	mechanisms	 could	be	 related	 to	 autistic	traits.	By	means	of	correlation	analyses	we	provided	support	for	a	functional	link	between	 the	motor	 interference	effect	and	 the	P3	effect.	This	 suggests	 that	 the	more	 individuals	were	 able	 to	distinguish	between	 congruent	 and	 incongruent	trials	at	high	 levels	of	processing,	 the	more	 interference	 they	experienced	on	a	behavioural	level.		Contrary	 to	 expectations,	 we	 did	 not	 detect	 significant	 correlational	findings	between	the	ERP	congruency	effects	and	social	autistic	 traits	(Brass	et	al.,	2009;	Spengler	et	al.,	2010;	Spengler,	Von	Cramon,	et	al.,	2009).	As	such,	we	would	 not	 confirm	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 high-level	 social-cognitive	 self-other	distinction	is	associated	with	(non-clinical)	autistic	traits.	Though	one	should	be	careful	 with	 interpreting	 a	 null	 result,	 this	 might	 suggest	 that	 hyperimitation	found	for	groups	with	higher	autistic	traits	(Bird	et	al.,	2007;	Sophie	Sowden	et	al.,	2015;	Spengler	et	al.,	2010)	may	be	related	to	processes	rather	than	to	high-level	social-cognitive	processes.			
Limitations	One	 should	 be	 aware	 that	 all	 three	 components	 have	 some	 temporal	overlap.	 Yet	 they	 can	 be	 distinguished	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 topography	 and	temporal	signature.	In	the	literature,	the	cognitive	processes	that	are	assumed	to	drive	 the	 effects	 in	 the	 N190,	 P3	 and	 RP	 components	 are	 considered	 as	functionally	 distinct:	 The	 N190	 has	 strongly	 been	 related	 to	 the	 processing	 of	body-related	visual	information	(Thierry	et	al.,	2006)	and	has	been	related	to	the	
EBA/MT	complex	in	the	temporal	cortex	(Borhani	et	al.,	2016,	2015;	Thierry	et	al.,	2006).	The	P3	component	has	been	related	to	stimulus	evaluation,	decision,	novelty	 processing	 and	 working	 memory	 updating	 (Friedman,	 Cycowicz,	 &	Gaeta,	 2001;	 Polich,	 2007;	 Verleger	 et	 al.,	 2005),	 and	 to	 processes	 linking	perception	 to	 action	 (Verleger	 et	 al.,	 2005).	 Frontoparietal	 areas	 including	TPJ	(Mulert	et	al.,	2004;	Volpe	et	al.,	2007)	have	been	related	to	the	P3.	The	RP	on	the	other	 hand	 has	 thoroughly	 been	 discussed	 in	 terms	 of	 motor	 preparation	processes	 (e.g.	 Leuthold	 &	 Schröter,	 2011;	 Shibasaki	 &	 Hallett,	 2006).	 It	 is	assumed	 that	 the	 (pre-)SMA	 is	 related	 to	 the	early	 readiness	potential	 and	 the	premotor	 cortex	 and	 primary	 motor	 cortex	 are	 related	 to	 the	 late	 readiness	potential	 (Leuthold	&	 Schröter,	 2011;	Rigoni	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Schröter	&	Leuthold,	2009;	 Shibasaki	 &	 Hallett,	 2006;	 Xu,	 Sommer,	 &	Masaki,	 2015).	 Therefore,	 we	consider	it	unlikely	that	the	reported	effects	are	not	functionally	dissociated,	an	interpretation	that	 is	also	supported	by	the	distinct	topographical	maps	for	the	N190	and	Laplacian	RP	effects	(see	figure	2B).		In	 addition,	 it	 is	 theoretically	 possible	 that	 processes	 related	 to	 the	imperative	cue	that	are	not	linked	to	motor	preparation	cause	our	effects.	In	this	case,	 our	 results	 would	 be	 generated	 by	 non-motor	 cognitive	 processes	 (i.e.,	linguistic,	abstract	or	symbolic	ones).	However,	we	do	not	think	that	this	is	very	likely.	 First,	 there	 is	 no	 semantic	 overlap	 between	 the	 imperative	 stimuli	 (i.e.,	numbers)	and	 the	 finger	movements.	 In	 this	 respect	 the	effect	 is	very	different	from	a	Stroop	effect,	for	example.	Second,	response	time	in	this	task	are	very	fast,	making	 it	 very	 unlikely	 that	 the	 symbolic	 cue	 is	 first	 translated	 in	 a	 sematic	representation	 which	 then	 triggers	 the	 motor	 program.	 Because	 we	 have	 no	
direct	 experimental	 evidence	 for	 this	 claim,	 we	 did	 choose	 to	 present	 the	alternative	interpretation	here.		
Conclusion	
	 The	current	EEG-study	expands	 findings	of	 fMRI-studies	 focusing	on	the	imitation	inhibition	task	(Brass	et	al.,	2005;	Spengler	et	al.,	2010;	Spengler,	Von	Cramon,	 et	 al.,	 2009),	 by	 identifying	 a	 role	 of	 low-level	 visual	 and	 motor	preparation	 processes	 in	 the	 imitation	 inhibition	 task.	 As	 such,	 it	 underscores	various	theories	that	assume	a	strong	linkage	between	low-level	visual	processes	and	low-level	action	preparation	(Brass	et	al.,	2009;	Hommel	et	al.,	2001;	Shin	et	al.,	 2010).	 Additionally,	 our	 correlational	 findings	 suggest	 that	 the	 P3	 is	functionally	related	to	the	RT	congruency	effect.	We	could,	however,	not	identify	a	relationship	between	the	ERP	congruency	effects	and	non-clinical	autistic	traits	(Bird	 et	 al.,	 2007;	 Cook	 &	 Bird,	 2012;	 Cook	 et	 al.,	 2014;	 Gowen	 et	 al.,	 2008;	Spengler	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 Overall,	 our	 study	 implies	 the	 existence	 of	 functionally	distinct	effects	of	perception	on	action,	action	on	perception,	and	high-level	self-other	distinction	within	the	imitation	inhibition	task.		
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Figures	and	legends	
Figure	1:	Design	of	the	paradigm	
	
Figure	2:	A.	Topographical	maps	of	the	visual	N190,	the	P3	and	the	RP	Laplacian.	Electrodes	of	interest	are	marked	in	black.	B.	Topographical	maps	of	the	congruency	effect	(I-C)	of	the	visual	N190	and	of	the	RP	Laplacians	in	their	respective	time	frames	of	interest.			
	
Figure	3:	N190	components.	A.	Pooled	event-related	potentials	(ERPs)	over	the	relevant	electrodes	for	left	and	right	hemisphere	electrodes		(N190L	and	N190R,	respectively).	B.	N190	amplitude	charts.	(Error	bars	denote	standard	error;	***	p	<	.001;	*	p	<	.05).	
	
Figure	4:	RP	Laplacians.	A.	event-related	potentials	(ERPs)	shown	at	electrode	FCz:	More	amplified	Laplacians	for	incongruent	than	for	congruent	trials.	B.	RP	Laplacians	chart.	(Error	bars	denote	standard	error;	**	p	<	.01).	
	
Figure	5:	P3	component.	A.	P3	ERPs.	B.	P3	amplitude	charts.	(Error	bars	denote	standard	errors;	**	p	<	.01)	
		Figure	6:	Correlational	results	with	the	motor	interference	effect.	A	regression	line	is	marked	in	black.	
	 		
 
